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Abstract 
Highly destructive man-made and natural disasters during the first years of 
the 21st century have brought under scrutiny the Federal government’s involvement 
in post-disaster operations. A number of Federal agencies are mandated to assist 
civil authorities with preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. As a 
department with access to unique capabilities and tremendous manpower 
resources, the Department of Defense has played a key role in such operations. The 
exact role of the Defense Department, however, remains misunderstood by a 
number of key individuals and organizations. This research project investigated the 
various processes available to either Local, State or Federal authorities to request 
Department of Defense involvement. A number of critical factors must be considered 
by Federal, State and Local officials prior to either requesting or authorizing such 
involvement, as the use and activities of Federal military forces within the continental 
United States are carefully regimented. This project examined United States codes, 
as well as the Federal regulations and mandates governing military forces, in order 
to assess the processes that determine the nature and extent of Department of 
Defense involvement in post-disaster operations.  
Keywords:  Department of Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, 
DSCA, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function, Military 
Logistics, Pre-scripted Mission Assignment, Defense Coordination Officer/ Element, 
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I.  Introduction 
A number of highly visible natural and man-made disasters have taken 
place within the American territories during the first decade of the 21st century. 
The destructive nature of these disasters has highlighted the role played by the 
Federal government in responding to these disasters. The pressure to further 
improve the coordination and integration of the numerous Federal agencies and 
departments involved in disaster response and recovery operations remains 
omnipresent. 
The US military has played a key role in providing support to civil 
authorities following natural and man-made disasters within American territories 
dating back to the early 19th century (Buchalter, 2007).  Military disaster relief 
operations, under the title of Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), have 
taken place regularly since then. The government has responded to a number of 
contingencies—including fires, floods, earthquakes, civil unrest and hurricanes.  
The United Stated Department of Defense (DoD) officially defines DSCA 
operations as: 
support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, National Guard forces 
[…], DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, and DoD component assets, 
in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for special 
events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and 
other domestic activities. (DoD, 2009) 
The nature and extent of DoD involvement within DSCA operations has 
varied over time; however, the 1990s were a decisive period of time in homeland 
humanitarian assistance history (O’Brien, 2006).  In 1992, the DoD deployed 
three Joint Task Forces (JTF)—providing an estimated 28,000 soldiers, sailors, 
marines, airmen, and DoD civilians—as Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki and 
Typhoon Omar ravaged the southeastern region of the United States. While 
there were mixed public opinions as to the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
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(conducted by the GAO and the Director of Military Support) subsequently 
commended the DoD’s response as appropriate (O’Brien, 2006).  Both studies 
nonetheless identified that “speed of deployment and unity of command were 
areas for improvement” (O’Brien, 2006).  The Defense Department’s response 
was to implement a series of procedural, doctrinal, and force-structure changes 
in order to further refine the military’s role within a Federal humanitarian relief 
operation.  In addition, publications such as FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support 
Operations, which specifically addresses disasters and domestic emergencies; 
Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War; 
Joint Publication 3- 07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace 
Operations; and Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security were created to 
address the “multiple aspects of the military’s role in homeland humanitarian 
assistance operations” (O’Brien, 2006).  
Further, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Federal authorities 
acknowledged that additional measures were needed to ensure effective 
coordination with State and Local governments (Office of the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2006).  Thus, in the July 
2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President called for a “major 
initiative to build a national system for incident management and to integrate 
separate Federal response plans into a single, all-discipline incident 
management plan” (as cited in Office of the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2006). The President proposed that 
the initiative be led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Office of the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2006). 
The DoD, on its end, recognized the need for “a more integrated military 
response” to a contingency on the homeland, and established the US Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) (GAO, 2008a). 
The seemingly improved level of collaboration and integration among 
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both disasters of unexpected magnitudes—made landfall in the summer of 2005. 
A 2008 General Accounting Office report revealed that “despite a massive 
deployment of resources and support from both military and civil agencies, 
confusion arose as to what responsibilities the military had, and what capabilities 
it would provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic event” (GAO, 
2008a, 2). Thus, “despite the significant advances in doctrine, structure, and a 
common playbook resident in the post-Andrew National Response Plan, 
confusion and ‘the fog of war’ again had significant impact on a coordinated 
response” (O’Brien, 2006, 9).  The military did demonstrate the “capability to 
respond quickly to a natural disaster,” and also “the ability to execute excellent 
consequence management” (Osborne, 2006, 1).  Indeed, the Defense 
Coordinating Element responsible for managing requests for Federal military 
assistance deployed as many as 50,000 Guard troops and 22,000 active-duty 
troops, processed in excess of 115 requests for assistance and 98 missions in 
support of Louisiana—assistance totaling more than $840,000,000 in financial 
obligations (Owens & Schilling, 2006).  The response of the Federal government 
as a whole, however, “fell short of the seamless, coordinated effort” envisioned 
within the National Response Plan (Langowski, 2008, 12). 
A White House-mandated, post-crisis analysis titled, The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned (White House Office, 2006) 
identified key areas for military improvement, to include: 
 Improve the unity of effort between National Guard and active-duty 
Forces,  
 Streamline the process for requesting forces in the current “pull” 
structure, and  
 Improve communications between DHS, FEMA, Non-governmental     
Organizations, State, and Local authorities (O’Brien, 2006). 
A subsequent investigation by the “Select Bipartisan Committee to 
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“cordial with regards to the DoD response” (O’Brien, 2006, 10).  This committee 
identified numerous areas for improvement. They found:  
 National Guard and DoD response operations, though 
comprehensive, were perceived as slow.   
 The DoD lacked situational awareness of post-landfall conditions, 
which contributed to a slower response.  
 The lack of integration of National Guard and active-duty forces 
hampered the military response.  
 Northern Command did not have adequate insight into State 
response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which 
contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the 
Katrina response.  
 The DoD, FEMA, and the State of Louisiana had difficulty 
coordinating with each other, which slowed the response.  
 DoD/DHS coordination was not effective after Hurricane Katrina.  
 Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked joint training, which 
contributed to the lack of coordination between active-duty 
components.  
 The Department of Defense had not yet incorporated or 
implemented lessons learned from joint exercises in military 
assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed for a more 
effective response to Katrina (as cited in O’Brien, 2006).  
A. Objective 
The widespread confusion and frustration of the American public in 
regards to the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have led to a number of 
improvements in the coordination and communication within Local, State and 
Federal agencies, including the military.  However, there remain many 
organizations—Federal, State and Local—which are still unfamiliar with the way 
the military is integrated into a Federal disaster response and recovery operation.  
Such lack of knowledge can potentially lead to misunderstandings and distrust of 
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capabilities support Local, State and Federal authorities, as well as to identify the 
request processes available to civil authorities to receive effective military 
support following a natural or man-made disaster. An emphasis will be placed on 
the decision-makers involved in the request process, as well as on the 
constraints, laws and regulations governing a military response.  
The US Department of Defense is unarguably one of the best-equipped 
and best-trained Federal agencies capable of providing post-disaster assistance.  
The department can provide a range of capabilities, manpower and leadership on 
a scale that no other agency can achieve.  Yet, in spite of its extensive resources 
and capabilities, the DoD may not be expected and is not mandated to be the 
lead agency within a disaster response operation.  It is, therefore, imperative that 
every entity—Local, State or Federal—be familiar with how military capabilities fit 
within a response and recovery operation and how such capabilities may be 
requested. Indeed, a comprehensive understanding of the request processes for 
DSCA can provide emergency planners at all levels of government the ability to 
operate within what Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009) refer to as “the 
humanitarian space.” 
B. Organization and Methodology 
Chapter II consists of a literature review of existing frameworks governing 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations within USNORTHCOM and 
FEMA.  Chapter II also identifies disaster relief procedures, which were identified 
as either effective or ineffective following the response to Hurricane Katrina, the 
largest response to a natural disaster in the history of the United States. Chapter 
III provides a description of the relationships between the major responding 
agencies, as well as the legal framework that dictates these relationships.  
Elements from Figure 1 will be used and further explained throughout Chapter III 
as a mean to introduce the major entities, legal and organizational frameworks 
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Figure 1. Relationships between Response Agencies Responsible for the 
Coordination of Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
Chapter IV describes the processes available to Local, State and Federal 
agencies to request military assistance. This chapter also introduces the factors 
that are key to determining whether or not specific DSCA requests may be 
fulfilled. Figure 1 will be referred to throughout Chapter IV in order to illustrate the 
role of the various agencies involved in DSCA operations.   
Finally, Chapter V offers a series of observations that validate the 
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improve DSCA coordination and ensure that the United States Military continues 
to improve its ability to respond to disaster relief operations with both expediency 
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II.  Literature Review 
The US military’s response to a natural or man-made disaster has been an 
evolving process.  Most recently, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have been the major 
driving forces in that evolution.  These events brought about the development of the 
National Response Framework (US DHS, 2008c) and USNORTHCOM’s CONPLAN 
2501-05: Defense Support to Civil Authorities (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 2006).  These 
two documents provide the core of how the military, and the nation, will respond to a 
disaster.  In addition to these documents, there has been a large amount of other 
work published by others such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS); numerous academic and scholarly 
works have also been published on the subject.  These documents review the 
military’s response to Katrina and the steps it has taken since to improve its 
response capabilities and its coordination with other Local, State and Federal 
organizations.  They include the legal differences between an active-duty military 
response and a National Guard response, the process for how the active-duty 
military would be deployed and the capabilities it can bring.  Additionally, these 
documents provide commentary on the effectiveness of the current system and 
recommendations for its improvement.  The following are summaries of the most 
significant documents regarding a military response to a disaster and the capabilities 
the military can bring to such a situation. Section A discusses how the nation and the 
military will respond to a natural or man-made disaster.  Section B discuss a few of 
the documents that have assessed the performance of the military’s disaster 
response both during and after Hurricane Katrina. 
A. National and Military Disaster Response Documents 
These documents provide the structure on how the Federal government will 
respond to a natural or man-made disaster.  They cover a broad Federal response, 
which entails the entire Federal Government, as well as specific military documents 
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1. National Response Framework 
The National Response Framework (US DHS, 2008c) was developed by the 
Department of Homeland Security and FEMA to address how the Nation should 
respond to a disaster.  Originally named the National Response Plan, and first 
published in 2004, it is now referred to as the National Response Framework. The 
latest version was published in January 2008. 
a. Overview 
The National Response Framework (NRF or Framework) is the guide to how 
the Nation conducts an all-hazards response, which covers events from accidents 
and natural disasters to actual or potential terrorist attacks (US DHS, 2008c).  
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the President and Congress determined that 
the Federal Government needed to better organize its support of State, Local, and 
Tribal officials in response to incidents that range from the serious but purely local, 
to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.  The NRF is the 
current iteration of Federal planning for a coordinated response at all levels of 
government (US DHS, 2008c). 
The NRF is designed as a scalable, flexible and adaptable coordinating 
structure in order to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation.  It 
describes proven tactics that have developed at the Federal, State and Local levels.  
It is intended for government-executive, private commercial sector and non-
governmental organizations’ (NGO) leaders, as well as emergency management 
practitioners.  The NRF gives both a broad overview of the basic concepts and 
mechanics of a disaster response, as well as an explanation of the operating 
structures and tools used by emergency responders at the Federal, State, and Local 
levels.  It is the common “playbook” to ensure a coordinated response at all levels of 
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b. Scope 
The NRF provides structures for implementing nationwide response policy 
and operational coordination for all types of domestic incidents.  As stated above, 
the NRF is a scalable, flexible and adaptable plan; thus, it can be partially or fully 
implemented by Federal, State or Local officials.  It provides guidance on the full 
range of emergencies—from natural disasters to terrorist attacks. The NRF covers 
small, local emergencies all the way up to large-scale catastrophes that require a 
national-level response.  The NRF is intended to accelerate the response of all the 
players by giving a coordinated plan to the first responding agency, which gives 
clear guidance on how to proceed as further escalation is required (US DHS, 
2008c). 
c. Relevance 
The NRF is the base strategy by which all Federal disaster relief is governed.  
It describes for the emergency responders at the Federal, State and Local level the 
plan on how a coordinated response will be executed.  It also explains what pieces 
of an operation each agency will handle as it is brought into the situation.  As part of 
the Federal response, the military has its own responsibilities when it is requested to 
respond.  The NRF specifies the supporting role of Military forces and the chain-of-
command issues that make the Military unique from other responding agencies.  In a 
broad way, it also describes the criteria that the Military uses when deciding what 
missions it will take on and how they will fit into the existing command structure with 
the Principal Federal Official and Federal Coordinating Officer. 
2. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities 
USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, DSCA was written by the staff at United 
States Northern Command in May 2006.  It was prepared to fulfill the requirement 
set forth by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to prepare plans to support the 
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a. Overview 
CONPLAN 2501-05 is United States Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) 
concept plan for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations.  First, civil 
authorities must request assistance. Once a request for support is approved by the 
Secretary of Defense or directed by the President, USNORTHCOM will respond 
quickly and effectively to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great 
property damage.  This includes both large-scale disaster responses and smaller-
scale support of Federal, State and Local agencies (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 2006). 
In support of the National Response Framework, CONPLAN 2501-05 
describes how the DoD can respond to a disaster.  It describes the key tasks that 
USNORTHCOM is concerned with, including:  
 save lives, prevent human suffering, and reduce great property 
damage,  
 provide assistance to a Primary or Coordinating Agency,  
 synchronize with Local, State, and Federal response efforts,  
 and anticipate requirements to enable first responders to continue their 
response efforts (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 2006). 
CONPLAN 2501-05 continues by describing how USNORTHCOM will 
respond; in other words, it provides its Concept of Operations.  Its responses can be 
tailored to small-scale operations, with a senior military officer as the Defense 
Coordinating Officer (DCO) assisting the Joint Field Office (JFO) to coordinate 
responding military units.  For medium and large-scale responses, a Joint Task 
Force (JTF)—or multiple JTFs—can be deployed to coordinate multiple responding 
DoD forces assisting Local, State, and Federal agencies (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 
2006). 
The CONPLAN structure is a five-phase plan: Phase I, Shaping; Phase II, 
Staging; Phase III, Deployment; Phase IV, Support of Civil Authorities; Phase V, 
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these phases for a short-notice response.  To allow responders the ability for a more 
flexible response while still continuing with the previous stage, USNORTHCOM 
designed these phases to overlap as the situation dictates. In other words, the 
response can move forward while responders are still finishing work in the previous 
phases.  Each phase is intended to build on the previous phase until the final 
turnover of responsibilities to other agencies occurs and forces depart the area of 
operations (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 2006). 
 
Figure 2. CONPLAN 2501 Phases  
CONPLAN 2501-05 provides detailed plans for all DoD components from the 
Army and Navy to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA).  Each component has specific instructions on what it will 
be prepared to do for its part of a DSCA.  The CONPLAN also describes how these 
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describes the Concept of Logistics Support for DSCA operations and how 
command-and-control authority will be carried out (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 2006). 
b. Scope 
CONPLAN 2501-05 is the over-arching response plan for USNORTHCOM for 
the Defense Support of Civil Authorities.  It encompasses all of the DoD components 
that have responsibilities to respond.  It covers many of the potential scenarios that 
could take place—from wildfires to terrorist attacks to a catastrophic hurricane.  This 
is a macro-level document that gives guidance to DoD and non-DoD agencies on 
what to expect with a military deployment in support of DSCA (CDRUSNORTHCOM, 
2006). 
c. Relevance 
A DoD response to a request for DSCA is a complex affair, and CONPLAN 
2501-05 details how a DSCA deployment will be carried out.  It covers the task 
organization, operations, communications, public affairs and logistics.  This 
information is effective at explaining a DoD response, although it is written for the 
military.  The goal of this paper will be to make this information useful for not only the 
military, but for the civilian agencies that may wish to request assistance.  It will 
explain the DoD response information within the context of the civilian response 
framework. 
3. Emergency Support Function #7 – Logistics Management and 
Resource Support Annex 
Emergency Support Function #7 was written by the Department of Homeland 
Security and FEMA in January 2008 to establish roles for Federal government 
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Emergency Support Function (ESF) #7 – Logistics Management and 
Resource Support Annex provides the operating plan for how the Federal 
government will coordinate logistics during a national disaster response.  ESF #7 
assigns the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) with providing a national disaster logistics planning, 
management and sustainment capability with the help of other Federal logistics 
partners, key public and private stakeholders, and Non-governmental organizations 
to meet the needs of disaster victims and responders.  It also states that the General 
Services Administration (GSA) will support Federal, State and Local agencies that 
need resources support prior to, during, and after incidents requiring a coordinated 
Federal response.  ESF #7 describes the types of logistics services that FEMA and 
the GSA will provide, and it also lists the logistics functions of the Federal partners 
that can be assigned to assist FEMA and the GSA (US DHS, 2008b). 
b. Scope: 
ESF #7 describes how the Federal Government, through FEMA and the GSA, 
will coordinate the logistics functions required in a Federal disaster response.  It 
tasks FEMA and the GSA with specific responsibilities in logistics management and 
resource support, and it lists the different logistics functions for which each Federal 
partner has responsibility (US DHS, 2008b). 
c. Relevance: 
ESF #7 gives the logistics plan that will be carried out during a Federal 
disaster response.  As one of the Federal partners in this plan, the DoD has the 
responsibility to assist in providing: 
 Subsistence 
 Administrative Supplies 
 Petroleum Products 
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 Personal Demand Items 
 Major End-items: Mobile Units 
 Medical Material 
 Telecommunications Management 
 Transportation Management 
It details the logistics functions that will be the focus of the military logistics 
capabilities described in this paper (US DHS, 2008b). 
4. Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department 
of Defense in Support of Homeland Defense 
This report was written by Alice Buchalter for the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress in February 2007 to bring together the statues, Executive 
Branch documents, regulations, and DoD internal directives that define and govern 
the Military’s response to national disasters. 
a. Overview: 
The DoD’s role in supporting civil authorities in disaster response has been 
developing since the passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.  Since then, 
the role of the military in response to domestic emergencies has gone through 
several regulatory and legislative updates, but the primary mission has always been 
that the DoD will support other Federal agencies and State and Local officials as 
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.  This role is clearly defined in the 
Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department of Defense in 
Support of Homeland Defense (Buchalter, 2007); it provides all of the major 
regulatory and legislative documents that cover the legal authority needed for the 
DoD to respond.  It also addresses the different levels of responsibility the DoD and 
the National Guard have when involved in military support to civil authorities 
(MSCA).  Lastly, it explains the role of States and their governors in MSCA, DoD 
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b. Scope: 
This report encompasses all components of the DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marines and the Army and Air National Guards.  It discusses both the Federal role of 
the DoD, as well as each State’s command over the Army and Air National Guards 
of that State and their unique authority for MSCA.  This MSCA role has long been a 
part of the mission of the DoD, but with the events of 9/11 and the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster, the scope and importance of the military’s response has greatly increased 
(Buchalter, 2007). 
c. Relevance: 
The purpose of our report is to examine the role of the DoD in MSCA, the 
legal methods for the DoD to respond, and how it will respond in a disaster.  The 
legal ability to respond and the laws and regulations that govern that response have 
a major impact on what capabilities the military can provide in its response.  If these 
responsibilities and legal restrictions were not defined, there could be little 
coordination at the Federal, State or Local level—which would result in a slower 
response, further suffering and worse damage to property (Buchalter, 2007). 
5. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the 
Stafford Act) was originally passed by Congress into law in 1988 as the updated 
version of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.  The latest amendments to the Stafford 
Act were passed in 2007 (US Congress, 2007b). 
a. Overview: 
The Stafford is the primary legislation governing the Federal response to 
disasters in the United States.  It directs how disasters are declared, the types of 
assistance that can be provided, and how the costs are to be divided between 
Federal, State and Local governments (Moss & Shelhamer, 2007).  It was drafted to 
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presidential declaration system that allows for financial and physical assistance to be 
directed to Federal, State and Local government agencies for the purpose of 
disaster relief.  This relief is directed through FEMA, an agency within the 
Department of Homeland Security, which has the responsibility of coordinating 
Federal government response planning and disaster responses.  The Stafford Act is 
a growing document that has been amended several times in response to lessons 
learned from disaster responses—such as the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006, which took many of the lessons from Katrina and 
incorporated them into the Stafford Act. 
b. Scope: 
The Stafford Act is the overarching document that governs the Federal 
response to natural and man-made disasters in the United States.  It covers how the 
president will declare a disaster to the different types of disasters that can be 
declared and what type of aid each one of those disaster types is meant to receive. 
c. Relevance 
Our project of assessing the request process for attaining military assistance 
in a disaster situation is meant to describe how the military ties into the Federal 
response framework and the different ways the military can provide DSCA.  This 
requires a review of the relevant legislation that directs the Federal response to a 
disaster.  The Stafford Act is one of the key pieces of legislation, and it directs the 
rest of the framework that has been created for a Federal response. 
B. Response Assessment Documents 
The documents below provide assessments of how the Federal Government 
has responded to disasters.  They show the positive and negative results of Federal 
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1. Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters 
Written in May 2006 by the Government Accountability Office, this report was 
to provide Congressional Committees with information about how the Military could 
better respond to natural disasters (GAO, 2006). 
a. Overview: 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast of the 
United States.  Due to the scope of the disaster, the military was called in to provide 
assistance in relief operation; however, Federal, State, and Local responders did not 
understand the full capabilities of the military and the types of assistance it could 
provide.  There was also a lack of understanding by the military about what types of 
capabilities were wanted and what capabilities would be provided by Federal and 
National Guard forces.  The National Guard was the first to respond, and as the 
magnitude of the effort became clearer, active-duty forces were deployed to 
supplement the National Guard.  Once deployed, the military had trouble gaining 
situational awareness and organizing its response because of a lack of timely 
damage assessment, communications difficulties, force-integration problems, 
uncoordinated search-and-rescue efforts and unexpected logistics responsibilities.  
These could all have been avoided with better planning and exercises that included 
all responders.  Following Hurricane Katrina, all levels of government—including the 
DoD—are examining the lessons learned and incorporating them into future 
planning for a better, more coordinated response at all levels of government (GAO, 
2006). 
b. Scope: 
This GAO report takes a specific look at the military’s response to Hurricane 
Katrina.  It also examines the government’s National Response Plan and the plans 
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identifies a number of problems with the existing plans.  It also explores the lack of 
effective coordination that had taken place prior to Hurricane Katrina. 
c. Relevance:  
Our goal with this study is to define the capabilities of the military in disaster 
relief situations and the processes that it takes to request that assistance.  This 
study will then examine prior disaster responses to see what better coordination 
processes could be used  to allow for a more effective and quicker response.  The 
GAO report gives a review of the military’s response and problems that occurred, 
which will then be compared to the current system to see if changes were made and 
if those changes have been effective. 
2. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned 
These lessons learned were written by the White House in February 2006 to 
catalog many of the lessons learned from the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. 
a. Overview: 
This review was ordered by the President to review the Federal preparedness 
and response to Hurricane Katrina.  It first examines pre-Katrina plans on how the 
Federal Government would respond to a national disaster.  The report then explores 
the Hurricane’s development “Pre-landfall” and what steps were taken by the 
Federal Government to prepare for its response—from stock-piled material to the 
personnel that were put on standby.  It then looks at the “Week of Crisis” from 
August 29 through September 5, in which State and Local emergency capabilities 
were completely overwhelmed, and a Federal response was required.  It 
investigates the extraordinary response by all of the responding partners but also 
identifies deficiencies that occurred and recommends needed improvements.  The 
document also reviews the final phase-shift from response to recovery. It examines 
lessons learned covering the seventeen critical challenges that were problematic 
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“Transforming National Preparedness,” discusses the changes necessary to fix the 
problems identified by Hurricane Katrina.  The foundations of the recommended 
reforms result in two priorities: a comprehensive National Preparedness System and 
a Culture of Preparedness (White House Office, 2006).   
b. Scope: 
This is a review of the Federal Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina.  
Although disaster preparedness and response is largely a State and Local function, 
this report does not include them in this assessment—except where they affected 
Federal Government decisions.  The primary focus for these lessons learned is the 
systematic issues and gaps that require improvements in the way the Federal 
government responds to disasters (White House Office, 2006). 
c. Relevance: 
This project’s goal is developing a better understanding of the process for 
requesting DoD disaster support and capabilities that can be used in DSCA.  Once 
that process has been identified, a review of prior incidents will be investigated to 
see how that process was used and if it was effective.  The largest response to any 
disaster was the response to Hurricane Katrina.  The lessons learned from this case 
are invaluable if we truly intend to discover what went both right and wrong and how 
our current capabilities have been shaped by those responses.  
3. HOMELAND DEFENSE: US Northern Command Has Made 
Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness 
Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues 
This report was written by the Government Accountability Office in April 2008 
to provide Congressional Requesters with information regarding the progress of 
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a. Overview: 
This GAO report reviews NORTHCOM’s work on developing and revising 
plans for homeland defense and civil support missions.  Additionally, it reviews 
NORTHCOM’s tracking of the other DoD organizations that are required to develop 
plans on how they will support NORTHCOM in the event of a disaster.  Three key 
planning areas are also defined as challenges that NORTHCOM needs to address. 
1. NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it 
may need because it does not have more detailed information from 
DHS or the States on the specific requirements needed from the 
military in the event of a disaster. 
2. NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities 
allocated to its plans. 
3. NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for 
its civil support mission because its plans do not specify mission tasks 
against which units can be assessed. 
NORTHCOM has taken actions to minimize these issues, but further work is 
required (GAO, 2008a) 
This report also has 25 pre-scripted mission assignments that NORTHCOM 
and FEMA officials coordinated in order to facilitate the process for requesting DoD 
capabilities in the event of an emergency.  These pre-scripted mission assignments 
include coordination teams, transportation support, communications support, 
engineering support, logistical support, and more.  These mission assignments are 
designed to leverage the DoD’s areas of expertise and capabilities in situations in 
whch civil agencies typically fall short (GAO, 2008a). 
b. Scope: 
This report covers all of NORTHCOM’s plans for homeland defense and civil 
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completeness and adequacy.  It also compares them with existing FEMA plans and 
the fifteen national planning scenarios to determine if NORTHCOM plans supported 
those scenarios. 
c. Relevance: 
This paper is reviewing the response request process of NORTHCOM to 
provide assistance for DSCA.  By identifying existing capabilities, the researcher 
hopes to analyze the following: what has already been defined, the process that was 
needed to receive that assistance, and anything that may still be needed based on a 
review of previous incidents.  The GAO’s review of NORTHCOM allows for future 
improvement analysis. 
There is an enormous amount of literature on the topic of Defense support to 
civil authorities.  We have picked out the relevant national and military disaster 
response documents, which describe how a disaster response should happen.  We 
have also selected some response assessment documents that provide insight on 
how Federal disaster responses worked in the past and the positive and negative 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 24 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 25 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
III. Response Agencies 
A number of publicly funded, Federal agencies may potentially be called upon 
to assist Local, State or Federal authorities with responding to a man-made or 
natural disaster. The National Response Framework (NRF) dictates which 
departments or agencies may be activated to play a “primary, coordinating, and/or 
support role based on their authorities, resources, and the nature of the threat or 
incident” (US DHS, 2008c). Per the NRF, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within DHS, and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) all play a vital role in the event of a contingency within 
the United States. The purpose of Chapter III is to identify the mission, 
responsibilities, authority, and capabilities of these major relief agencies in the 
coordination and dissemination of DSCA support. Section A addresses the role of 
the Department of Homeland Security. Section B focuses on one of DHS’s 
subordinate organization, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Section C 
finally introduces the entities within the Department of Defense responsible for 
managing requests for military assistance.   
A. The Department of Homeland Security  
By Presidential directive and statute, the Secretary of Homeland Security is 
the principal Federal official responsible for the “coordination of Federal resources 
utilized in the prevention of, preparation for, response to, or recovery from terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies” (US DHS, 2008c).   
1. Brief History 
President George W. Bush, within weeks of the attacks of September 11, 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 26 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
consolidate agencies responsible for security within the United States.  Under the 
leadership of former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, OHS—in conjunction with 
public and private partners—first developed a National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, which focused homeland security functions into six critical mission areas: 
 Intelligence and Warning, 
 Border and Transportation Security, 
 Domestic Counterterrorism,  
 Protecting Critical Infrastructure, 
 Defending against Catastrophic Terrorism, and  
 Emergency Preparedness and Response. (Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002) 
The mission areas were determined in order to most effectively support the 
strategic objectives of OHS, namely: 
 Preventing terrorist attacks within the United States,  
 Reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and  
 Minimizing the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur. 
(Office of Homeland Security, 2002) 
In June 2002, President Bush announced his intention to create a permanent 
Cabinet-level Department in order to further unite essential agencies charged with 
protecting the homeland.  Bush foresaw four essential missions to the department: 
 Border and Transportation Security,  
 Emergency Preparedness and Response,   
 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures, and   





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 27 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2. Agency Consolidation 
The position of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security was 
subsequently replaced with a cabinet-level position of Secretary of Homeland 
Security when the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 created the United States 
Department of Homeland Security. The DHS History Office reports that pre-DHS 
homeland security activities were spread “across more than 40 Federal agencies 
and an estimated 2,000 separate Congressional appropriations accounts” (US DHS, 
2008c). However, upon its creation in 2003, DHS consolidated the activities of these 
agencies and assumed control of a number of organizations previously controlled by 
other Departments, to include the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 
US Coast Guard (USCG) (US DHS, 2008c). Figure 3 provides the functions and 
organizations that fall under the responsibility of the Secretary of Homeland Security.  
 
Figure 3. Organization Chart, US Department of Homeland Security  
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The resulting re-organization of Federal-level Departments and agencies 
provided DHS not only with a wide range of statutory authorities, subject-matter 
expertise, assets and operational capabilities, but also with considerable 
responsibilities and resources for emergency response (US DHS, 2008c). 
B. Federal Emergency Management Agency  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, as identified in Figure 3, is an 
agency subordinate to the DHS. The agency’s primary mission is: 
to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, 
including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, 
by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive 
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. (FEMA, 2008, iii)  
The National Response Framework identifies the administrator of FEMA as 
the principal advisor to “the President, the Secretary, and the Homeland Security 
Council on all matters regarding emergency management” (Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002).  The FEMA Administrator’s duties include operating the National 
Response Coordination Center, the effective support of all Emergency Support 
Functions (ESF), and the preparation for, protection against, response to, and 
recovery from all-hazards incidents” (US DHS, 2008c).   
In addition, the FEMA administrator is in a vital position to assist the 
Secretary with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) (Management 
of Domestic Incidents) responsibilities, which consist of identifying “situations for 
which DHS shall assume overall Federal incident management coordination 
responsibilities within the Framework” (US DHS, 2008c). Such events call for the 
implementation of the Framework’s coordinating mechanisms and meets one or 
more below-listed criteria:  
 A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has 
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 The resources of State and Local authorities are overwhelmed, and 
Federal assistance has been requested. 
 More than one Federal department or agency has become 
substantially involved in responding to the incident. (US DHS, 2008c, 
25) 
The Secretary has been directed by the President to assume incident 
management responsibilities. (US DHS, 2008c) 
1. Statutory Authority 
The 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 
PL 100-707 (US Congress, 2007b), provides FEMA with the statutory authority to 
conduct Federal disaster response activities. The Stafford Act amended the original 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288, and was itself amended by the Pets 
Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006, and the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (US Congress, 2007b). According to the 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, FEMA’s mandate is to 
support its primary mission by leading “the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect 
against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, 
acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents” 
(US Congress, 2007b).  The 2007 DHS Appropriation Act also identifies that FEMA 
is to develop and maintain “robust Regional Offices” and “partner with State, Local, 
and tribal governments and emergency response providers, with other Federal 
agencies, with the private sector, and with nongovernmental organizations to build a 
national system of emergency management” (US Congress, 2007a, 42). The 
Government Accounting Office also reports that the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 further enhanced “FEMA’s responsibilities within 
DHS,” to include the “ongoing management and maintenance of the National 
Incident Management System and the National Response Plan”—now known as the 
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2.  Organization 
FEMA’s organizational structure reflects the nature of its activities and range 
of responsibilities. The agency is organized into nine Offices and nine Directorates 
overseen by the Administrator. The Administrator, in turn, is advised by the National 
Advisory Council, whose role also includes the revision of the national preparedness 
goal, the national preparedness system, the National Incident Management System, 
the National Response Plan, as well as other related plans and strategies (FEMA, 
2009c). Figure 4 identifies the organization of the Directorates and Offices under the 
authority of the FEMA Administrator.   
 
Figure 4. Organization Chart, Federal Emergency Management Agency  
(FEMA, 2009, June 25) 
In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, FEMA maintains a 
permanent presence within 10 regional offices (Figure 5), each headed by a 
Regional Administrator. The mission of theses offices is to “support the development 
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better prepared, “mobilize Federal assets and evaluation teams to work with State 
and Local agencies,” as well as manage an interagency Regional Response 
Coordination Center (RRCC)  (US DHS, 2008c, 61). Such close cooperation with 
other Federal agencies, strategic partners and tribal, State and Local authorities 
further supports the agency’s mission and core competencies 
 
 
Figure 5. FEMA Regional Offices  
(FEMA, 2008, 44) 
3.  Assistance to Governmental Agencies 
FEMA has developed a number of documents and resource management 
principles in order to enable governmental agencies to structure their response and 
improve their respective capabilities (US DHS, 2008c). Such documents and 
principles of significance, especially to the Department of Defense, include The 
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a. National Response Framework 
The Post-Katrina Act mandates that FEMA administer and ensure the 
implementation of the National Response Framework, with “FEMA’s National 
Integration Center specifically responsible for periodically reviewing and revising the 
document, as appropriate”  (GAO, 2008b, 11). Per Figure 6, the NRF provides DHS/ 
FEMA and DHS with the authority and framework to lead a coordinated Federal 
response. 
 
Figure 6. Framework governing the role of DHS FEMA  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
The NRF is developed as a “guide to how the nation conducts an all-hazards 
response and manages incidents ranging from the smallest to the catastrophic” (US 
DHS, 2008c). As such, the NRF identifies the roles, responsibilities and structures 
that organize the national response, as well as how communities, States, the 
Federal Government and the private sector apply the key principles enabling a 
coordinated, effective national response. The NRF’s doctrine of “tiered response” 
especially emphasizes the need for all parties involved in disaster relief operations to 
prepare effectively, in order to best support responding and recovering efforts. Key 
“resource management principles” are thus identified to support the preparation 
phase and to “enhance response capabilities” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002). 
Two such principles are known as Pre-scripted Mission Assignments (PMSA), and 
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b. Pre-scripted Mission Assignments 
Federal and State governments and agencies use pre-scripted missions in 
order to identify the resources and capabilities required in response to a specific 
contingency. The implementation of such practice scenarios assists in planning, 
reduces post-disaster response time, and expedites the delivery of services and 
commodities in response to an incident (US DHS, 2008c). Thus, the Department of 
Defense, along with FEMA, has developed “26 all-hazard, pre-scripted mission 
assignments for DoD support and more than 30 PSMAs for US Army Corps of 
Engineers support” to include:  
  Heavy- and medium rotary-wing lift 
  Tactical transportation   
  Strategic transportation   
  Communications support   
  Emergency-route clearance   
  Damage assessment   
  Temporary housing   
  Mobilization centers and operational staging areas   
  Temporary medical facilities  
  Rotary wing medical evacuation (Stockton, 2009) 
c. Emergency Support Functions  
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) provide “the structure for coordinating 
Federal interagency support for a Federal response to an incident.” “They are 
mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently used to provide Federal support 
to States and Federal-to-Federal support” (US DHS, 2008b). The DoD has been 
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“support agency” to the below-listed ESFs—aside from ESF #9 Search and Rescue, 
for which the Department has been designated as the “primary agency.”  ESFs are 
as follows: 
 ESF #1 – Transportation  
 ESF #2 – Communications  
 ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering  
 ESF #4 – Firefighting  
 ESF #5 – Emergency Management  
 ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human 
Services  
 ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support  
 ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services  
 ESF #9 – Search and Rescue  
 ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response  
 ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 ESF #12 – Energy  
 ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security  
 ESF #14 – Long-term Community Recovery   
 ESF #15 – External Affairs  
Two ESFs, in particular, require a substantial military involvement: 
 Emergency Support Function #1 – Transportation 
 Emergency Support Function #7 – Logistics Management and 
Resource Support 
(1) Emergency Support Function #1 – Transportation 
Per the January 2008 National Response Framework, the Department of 
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ESF #1 requirements. As such, the DoT, with the assistance of the ESF #1 support 
agencies (including the DoD), provides transportation assistance in domestic 
incident management, including the following activities:  
 Monitor and report status of and damage to the transportation system 
and infrastructure as a result of the incident.  
 Identify temporary alternative transportation solutions that can be 
implemented by others when systems or infrastructure are damaged, 
unavailable, or overwhelmed.  
 Perform activities conducted under the direct authority of DoT 
elements as these relate to aviation, maritime, surface, railroad, and 
pipeline transportation.  
 Coordinate the restoration and recovery of the transportation systems 
and infrastructure.  
 Coordinate and support prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, 
and mitigation activities among transportation stakeholders within the 
authorities and resource limitations of ESF #1 agencies. (FEMA, 2009)  
Under ESF #1, however, the DoT is not responsible for the movement of 
goods, equipment, animals, or people (US DHS, 2008c).  
As a Support Agency, the DoD, when requested and upon approval by the 
Secretary of Defense, is specifically tasked to provide “military transportation 
capacity from the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)/alternate 
Command to move essential resources, including DoT response personnel and 
associated equipment and supplies” (US DHS, 2008b). USTRANSCOM is also 
expected to augment the Federal personnel assigned to ESF #1 function 
headquarters. A key DoD function also consists of providing “assets to complement 
temporarily degraded or disrupted DoT/Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) air navigation 
services capabilities, as requested by DoT/FAA and ESF #1” (US DHS, 2008d). In 
addition, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is also required to provide 
“support in the emergency operation and restoration of inland waterways, ports, and 
harbors under the supervision of DoD/USACE, including dredging operations, as 
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(2) ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource 
Support 
Under ESF #7, the DoD is further expected to contribute its logistics 
capabilities to disaster relief operations. The General Services Administration (GSA) 
is the Primary Agency (PA) responsible for Resource Support; however, the DoD is 
primarily involved with the agency responsible for Logistics Management, namely 
DHS/FEMA (US DHS, 2008b). As such, the DoD assists DHS/FEMA with the 
following Logistics Management functions: 
 Material management—which consists of determining requirements, 
sourcing, ordering and replenishment, storage, and issuing of supplies 
and equipment (US DHS, 2008b).   
 Transportation management—which consists of determining 
equipment and procedures for moving material from storage facilities 
and vendors to incident victims. Transportation management also 
includes fulfilling requests from other Federal organizations (US DHS, 
2008b).   
 Facilities management—which consists of the location, selection, and 
acquisition of storage and distribution facilities. Such facilities include 
Distribution Centers, Mobilization (MOB) Centers, and National 
Logistics Staging Areas. Logistics Management is responsible for 
establishing and operating facilities, as well as managing related 
services to shelter and support incident responders in Joint Field Office 
and other field-related operations, including Base Camps (US DHS, 
2008b). 
 Personal property management—which consists of policy and 
procedures guidance for maintaining accountability of material, as well 
as identification and reutilization of property acquired to support a 
Federal response operation (US DHS, 2008b). 
 Management of electronic data interchange—which provides end-
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 Planning and coordination—which consists of communication with 
internal and external customers and other supply-chain partners in the 
Federal and private sectors. This task also includes providing for the 
comprehensive review of best practices and available solutions for 
improving the delivery of goods and services to the customer (US 
DHS, 2008b).  
In order to assist the National Logistics Coordinator with the management of 
resource support requirements and the management of a DHS/GSA-run supply 
chain, the DoD is specifically tasked to provide logistical capabilities in support of the 
following ESF #7 sub-functions:  
 Subsistence, 
 Administrative Supplies Support, 
 Petroleum Products, 
 Engineering and Construction Materials, 
 Personal Demand Items (water and ice), 
 Medical Materials, 
 Telecommunications Management, and 
 Transportation Management. 
C. The Department of Defense  
Military involvement, while critical to disaster response operations, is subject 
to a number of legal constraints, constitutional and statutory provisions. This section 
identifies the circumstances under which military forces may be committed to 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities, as well as the military organizations, entities 
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1. Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
Under the Stafford Act, the governor of a State in which an incident occurred 
“may request the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to utilize the resources 
of the Department of Defense for the purpose of performing […] any emergency 
work which is […] essential for the preservation of life and property”  (US Congress, 
2007b, 28). Figure 7, derived from Figure 1, represents the request process from a 
State Governor to the US President. Such a Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) 
takes place once a State anticipates exhausting, or has exhausted, its own organic 
resources, as well as those from supporting States.  
 
Figure 7. State Request for Federal Assistance  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
In such instances authorized by the President, DoD components and 
agencies are authorized to respond to:  
 Save lives, 
 Protect property and the environment,  
 Mitigate human suffering under imminently serious conditions, and  
 Provide support under their separate established authorities. (US DHS, 
2008c) 
DoD involvement is dependent upon additional criteria. Indeed, provision of 











 Impact on readiness 
 Risk (US DHS, 2008c) 
The Stafford Act and Framework each stipulate, however, that the Federal 
military and civilian personnel and the resources involved in support of civil 
authorities operations may not be involved in such emergency work for a period to 
exceed ten days, and that they are to remain under the command of the Secretary of 
Defense (US DHS, 2008c).  
2. US Northern Command  
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Federal authorities 
acknowledged that measures were needed to ensure a more effective coordination 
and collaboration with State and Local governments (Office of the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2006). Thus, in the July 
2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President called for a DHS-led 
“initiative to build a national system for incident management and to integrate 
separate Federal response plans into a single, all-discipline incident management 
plan” (Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, 2006). The DoD, conceding the need for “a more integrated 
military response” to a contingency on the homeland, established the US Northern 
Command on October 1, 2002 (USNORTHCOM) (GAO, 2008a).  
USNORTHCOM’s role is “to provide command and control of Department of 
Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil 
authorities” (GAO, 2008a). Thus, USNORTHCOM’s specific mission is to “anticipate 
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area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its 
interests” (US Northern Command, 2009). The creation of USNORTHCOM was a 
decisive step towards addressing coordination inefficiencies with external agencies, 
as USNORTHCOM “consolidates under a single unified command existing missions 
that were previously disseminated amongst various DOD branches and 
organizations” (US Northern Command, 2009). Such unity of command was deemed 
critical to mission accomplishment and, in 2002, USNORTHCOM became 
responsible for coordinating Defense Support to Civil Authorities with State and 
Federal entities, to include the DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency. Per 
Figure 8, the area of responsibility of USNORTHCOM includes “the continental 
United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico,” as well as up to 500 nautical miles of 
surrounding oceans, which include the “Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and 
portions of the Caribbean region” (US Northern Command, 2009). 
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Once the President of the United States declares a Federal disaster area, a 
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) from FEMA is appointed to direct the Federal 
response. The FCO is responsible for activating various Federal agencies to provide 
emergency support functions to the disaster. At the FCO’s request, the Secretary of 
Defense designates a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who activates a Defense 
Coordinating Element (DCE) to coordinate requests for Federal military assistance. 
Per Figure 9, upon activation, the DCO first validates and subsequently coordinates 
a DoD response to requests for assistance submitted by the FCO. 
In order to further facilitate Federal support, a Principal Federal Official (PFO) 
may also be appointed at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
resolve interagency conflicts and to coordinate overall Federal incident management 
(Owens & Schilling, 2006). At the present time, personnel of the US Army North 
(ARNORTH), a USNORTHCOM subordinate command, are assigned on a 
permanent basis as DCO/DCE/Emergency Preparedness Liaison (EPLO) teams to 
every one of FEMA’s ten regions.   
 
Figure 9. Relationship between DCO/ DCE and Primary Agency  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
With two additional DCOs assigned to Guam and Hawaii in support of US 
Pacific Command (USPACOM), a total of 12 senior Army Officers are selected per 
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Figure 10. DCO Designation Criteria.  
(Armstrong, 2009)  
Ongoing responsibilities of a Defense Coordinating Officer/DCE/EPLO 
include: 
 Acting as subject-matter experts for all State & Federal emergency 
response plans;  
 Building synergy & habitual relationships with:  
o FEMA staff,  
o State emergency responders, and  
o State Adjutant General and Joint Force Headquarters-State 
staff;  
 Functioning as a key player in all Local, State, Federal, and DoD 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support exercises;  
 Monitoring oversight with all military installations regarding Base 
Support Installation (BSI) operations;  
 Conducting National Special Security Event (NSSE) planning and 
support;  
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However, in the event of an existing or imminent contingency, and assuming 
activation by the Secretary of Defense, the DCO serves as the DoD’s single point of 
contact at the Joint Field Office (JFO). As such, his responsibilities include: 
 “Processing requirements for military support,  
 Forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military 
organizations through DoD-designated channels, and  
 Assigning military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated Emergency 
Support Functions,” as listed under the National Response Framework. 
(FEMA, 2009, June 4) 
3. Forces in Support of DSCA 
DoD forces and resources may be committed either via National Guard 
support or following a request for Federal assistance submitted to the President of 
United States (US DHS, 2008c). However, the constitutional and statutory provisions 
governing the use of military force by the Federal and State governments (as well as 
the duty status of said forces) closely regulate the specific nature of DSCA activities 
in which military forces may engage. The duty status under which military forces 
operate within the United States (namely State Active Duty, Title 10 USC, or Title 32 
USC) dictates the nature of the activities these forces may engage in, as well as 
imposes a number of restrictions over their use. In addition, funding and command-
and-control issues are addressed depending on the authority under which military 
personnel and resources are committed to support DSCA operations. 
a. State Active Duty:  
National Guard (NG) forces differ from other military components routinely 
involved in DSCA operations in that they may be used under one of three distinct 
mandates, starting with State Active Duty. NG units and elements in State Active 
Duty are under the command and control of the governor for a State-funded 
purpose, authorized by State law. The constitutions and statutes of every State 
empower governors to access and utilize the Guard’s Federally assigned aircraft, 
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the use of fungible standardized equipment and supplies (Lowenberg, 2005). Such a 
mandate provides governors with the authority to activate and deploy National 
Guard forces in response to natural disasters—to include floods, earthquakes, or 
wild fires, as well as man-made emergencies, such as riots (i.e., World Trade 
Organization meeting, Seattle, 1999), civil unrest (i.e., World Bank meeting, District 
of Columbia, 2000) and terrorist attacks (i.e., World Trade Center attacks, New York 
City, 2001) (Lowenberg, 2005).  
b. Title 32 USC 
National Guard forces acting under United States Code 32 are funded by the 
Federal Government to perform shared State/Federal or primary Federal missions 
with the concurrence of the President or designee (i.e., Secretary of Defense), but 
remain, per Figure 12, under the command and control of the State Governor 
(Lystra, 2007). Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution provides the authority to 
use the National Guard under continuing State control, but in the service of the 
Federal government, to “execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and 
repel invasions” (as cited in Lowenberg, 2005).  
 
Figure 11. State Control of Title 32 Forces  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
A January 2008 enactment of Title 32 further authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to “provide funds to a governor to employ National Guard units or members 
to conduct homeland defense activities” deemed to be “necessary and appropriate” 
(USC, 2008, 32, Sec. 902). The statute defines “homeland defense activities” as 
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of the United States, or of the infrastructure or other assets of the United States 
determined by the Secretary of Defense as being critical to national security, from a 
threat or aggression against the United States” (USC, 2008, 32, Sec. 901).  
The National Response Framework stipulates that National Guard forces 
employed either under State Active Duty or Title 32 status are under the operational, 
tactical and administrative control of the governor and the State government, and 
are not part of “Federal military response efforts” (US DHS, 2008c). Figure 12 
identifies the major characteristics and the differences between each status under 
which military forces operate. 
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c. Title 10 USC or Federal Military Status 
Military forces under Title 10 status are under the command and control of the 
President, for a Federal purpose authorized by Federal law. Active-duty and reserve 
components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Coast Guard (Figure 13) are 
Federal military forces under the command and control of the Secretary of Defense, 
and funded by the Federal Government.  
 United States Army  United States Air Force 
 United States Navy  United States Marine Corps 
Figure 13. DoD Agencies involved in DSCA Operations  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
State National Guard units and elements may, under the “War Powers 
Clause” of the Constitution, be activated, including mobilized or “Federalized” and, 
as a result, operate “under Federal control and at Federal expense for national 
defense purposes” (Lowenberg, 2005). While not directly accessible to State 
governors, Title 10 forces may be used pursuant to the Stafford Act, 42 USC (sec 
5121), in support of a State. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act authorizes the president to declare a major disaster and, upon 
request from a State governor, to send in Federal military forces on “an emergency 
basis for up to ten days to preserve life and property” (Trebilcock, 2000).  
The activities performed within the United States by personnel under Title 
10—to include Title 10 duty performed by National personnel—are, however, subject 
to “a number of restrictions, including provisions of the Posse Comitatus (18 USC 
1385), which severely limits the use of Federal military forces in support of domestic 
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The 1878 “power of the county,” or Posse Comitatus Act, was passed with the 
intent of preventing the Army from enforcing domestic law in order to focus on its 
original national defense mission (Trebilcock, 2000). The Act plainly States that the 
Army or the Air Force may not be used “as a posse comitatus or otherwise to 
execute the laws,” “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress” (18 USC 1385). While the Act applies to the 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines (including their Reserve components), the 
National Guard, however, “when it is operating in its State status pursuant to Title 32 
of the U.S. Code, is not subject to the prohibitions on civilian law enforcement” 
(Trebilcock, 2000). In fact, “one of the expressed missions of the Guard is to 
preserve the laws of the State during times of emergency when regular law 
enforcement assets prove inadequate” (Trebilcock, 2000). Posse Comitatus 
restrictions apply to the Guard only when it is federalized pursuant to an exercise of 
presidential authority (Trebilcock, 2000). 
D.  Chapter Summary 
Chapter 3 identified three governmental agencies vital to a military response 
to a man-made or natural disaster within the United States: the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the 
Department of Defense. While the integration of efforts between these three 
agencies requires enormous coordination, their organizational structures, as well as 
a number of frameworks, principles and resources, have been either developed or 
improved in order to clearly define their roles, responsibilities, and authority during a 
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IV. Request Process for Local First 
Responders  
A growing mission for the US military, but one that has existed since almost 
its inception, has been support of Local communities in times of disaster.  This 
process has changed many times and is now guided by the National Response 
Framework (US DHS, 2008c) and US Northern Command’s CONPLAN 2501-05, 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Yet, there are also other directives that 
guide the military response in disaster situations.  There are many ways by which 
Local, State, and Federal agencies can receive assistance from the military.  The 
three most common ways for Local first responders are Mutual Aid Agreements, 
Immediate Response, and Request for Assistance through the Mission Assignment 
Process.  Each of these can be used independently or may build on another as a 
situation escalates and as time and expense increases. 
A. Immediate Local Response 
There are two forms of immediate local response: Mutual Aid Agreements 
and Immediate Response Authority.  Both have the benefit of allowing the local 
commander to respond on his own authority, but they also have limitations that need 
to be considered and understood. 
1. Mutual Aid Agreements 
The first form of Defense Support to Civil Authorities is the mutual aid 
agreement.  Mutual aid agreements allow DoD installations and the Local 
communities of which the installation is a part to support each other for both routine 
and catastrophic incidents, in accordance with Title 42, § 1856a (as cited in Office of 
the Assistant Setetary of Defense/Homeland Defense and America's Security 
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These agreements are pre-coordinated between DoD installation 
commanders and their Local communities to provide mutual support for fire, 
emergency medical services, hazardous materials response and decontamination 
support, and other public safety events (Armstrong, 2009).  Using a memorandum of 
agreement (MOA) or understanding (MOU)—which specifically defines the types of 
support that can be provided— installation commanders can draft these agreements 
by which they can support their Local communities and their Local communities can 
support them (Lystra, 2007).  These agreements are used to provide expertise that 
the installation or the Local community can supply to the other in case of an 
emergency.  Examples of this are when bases provide additional fire-fighting or 
hazardous-material response support to their Local communities that may not have 
that expertise or when Local communities may provide additional emergency 
medical services to installations that don’t have extensive medical services.  These 
agreements are not for long-term support; they are designed for immediate response 
for short-duration events, usually limited to seventy-two hours. 
2. Immediate Response Authority 
Another manner in which the DoD can respond to a request for assistance 
from civil authorities at the Local level is via a Federal DoD Component or military 
commander, or civilian equivalent, using their immediate response authority as set 
forth in DoD Directive 3025.15 (DoD, 1997).  DoD Components can receive a 
request from civil authorities for support for the purpose of “saving lives, preventing 
human suffering and mitigating great property damage under imminently serious 
conditions” and respond without prior approval from the Secretary of Defense 
(Lystra, 2007, 37).  Initial requests may be communicated verbally for immediate 
response in an emergent situation, but written requests must follow.  When practical, 
these requests and the support that was provided must be reported up the chain of 
command to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(DoD, 1997).  Immediate Response is also meant to be of a short duration, 
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must be submitted through the State for support, which could then request support 
from the Federal governement. Examples of the types of support that can be 
provided are listed by Arnold and Porter, LLP (2002, 2): 
 Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment; 
 Emergency restoration of essential public services (including fire-
fighting, water, communications, transportation, power and fuel); 
 Debris removal; 
 Monitoring and controlling contaminated areas; 
 Safeguarding, collecting and distributing food and essential supplies; 
and 
 Facilitating and reestablishing civil government functions. 
 
Figure 14 identifies the local DoD responses available to Local officials under 
the Immediate Response Authority and Mutual Aid Agreements coordinated 
between adjacent DoD facilities and Local authorities. 
 
Figure 14. Local DoD Support to Civil Authorities  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
3. Limitations to Mutual Aid Agreements and Immediate Response 
Authority 
There are limitations to the responses that Local commanders can provide 
using mutual aid agreements or their immediate response authority.  One of the 
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time.  These are not meant to be long-term responses to a catastrophic disaster 
situation.  They are meant to be short-term solutions (seventy-two hours) when time 
is of the essence and when the Local military installation can get to the scene and 
provide assistance before any other assistance can arrive.  In situations in which a 
long-term response is required, mutual aid agreements and immediate response 
authority are meant to provide assistance until neighboring community assistance 
agreements and State resources can be activated and deployed to provide 
assistance.   
Another limitation to these types of responses is the Posse Comitatus Act.  As 
discussed above, Posse Comitatus prohibits Federal military personnel and 
Federalized National Guard personnel from acting in a law-enforcement capacity 
within the United States.  Without specifically being authorized by the Constitution or 
Congress, Federal military personnel cannot conduct searches, seizures or arrests.  
This legislation also limits the use of assets that have the potential for lethality.  
These types of responses would not be at the Local commanders’ authority level 
and would need to be approved by the President, Secretary of Defense or Congress 
(Arnold and Porter LLP, 2002). 
B.  Request for Assistance from DoD Resources 
For the DoD to respond to a major natural or man-made disaster, decision-
makers must follow many steps to facilitate a prolonged military response.  This 
process ensures that all considerations are reviewed, and that decision-makers have 
determined that the military is the right agency to respond to a disaster.  Some of the 
criteria that will be reviewed will be: 
 Cost: Who is going to pay or reimburse the DoD? 
 Appropriateness: Should the DoD be the provider? 
 Readiness: Will the assistance have an adverse impact on the 
responding unit’s primary mission? 
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 Legality: What is the legal authority that permits or prohibits the 
assistance requested by civil authorities? 
 Lethality: Is there any potential for the use of lethal force by or against 
DoD forces? (Armstrong, 2009) 
In addition to these items, the DoD must also explore whether Local and 
State resources have been applied first and appropriately and must ensure the DoD 
is not competing with private, Local companies that have the same resources and 
could respond more quickly (Armstrong, 2009). 
1. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(Stafford Act) is the legislative basis through which the President can declare 
emergencies and major disasters and can provide assistance to State and Local 
governments.  The Stafford Act addresses many areas of disaster relief programs, 
disaster preparedness, and insurance coverage, but it specifically goes into how the 
Federal government can provide assistance and how States can request that 
assistance.  At the request from a State governor, the President may declare a 
major disaster based on his belief that circumstances in the affected State are “of 
such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the 
State, and the affected Local governments and that Federal assistance is 
necessary” (US Congress, 2007b).  Once that determination has been made, and 
the President declares a major disaster, he may do the following to provide general 
assistance: 
 Direct any Federal agency to utilize its authorities and the resources 
granted to it by Federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, 
facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support 
of State and Local assistance response and recovery efforts; 
 Coordinate all disaster-relief assistance provided by Federal agencies, 
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 Provide technical and advisory assistance to affected State and Local 
governments for: 
o the performance of essential community services, 
o issuance of warning of risks and hazards, 
o public health and safety information, including its dissemination, 
o provisions of health and safety measures, 
o management, control, and reduction of immediate threats of 
public health and safety, and 
o recovery activities, including disaster impact assessments and 
planning; 
 Assist in the distribution of medicine, food, and other consumable 
supplies and emergency assistance; 
 Provide accelerated assistance and support to save lives, prevent 
human suffering, or mitigate severe damage. (US Congress, 2007) 
2. Request for Assistance 
After an incident has occurred, it is up to Local first responders to provide 
immediate assistance.  To immediately assist with the incident, the DoD can provide 
assistance through the mutual aid and immediate response process.  If the response 
will require more assistance or more time, the Local government will then need to 
request additional aid from the State governor.  This aid can come in the form of 
State Police, State-funded fire fighters or hazardous material teams, State-controlled 
National Guard units, or other State resources. Additionally, States can utilize the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process, which is an 
interstate support agreement between States by which States can support each 
other with additional resources.  Coordinated by the National Emergency 
Management Association (NEMA), the EMAC process is administered by a full-time 
staff, and all support is reimbursed by the supported State.  The EMAC is not the 
only mutual aid agreement among States. Mutual aid agreements can also exist 
between different cities, towns and counties to provide assistance to the 
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Once all available State resources have been utilized and if the State 
anticipates that additional assistance is still required, the State governor can make a 
request to the President for a disaster declaration.  Figure 15 identifies the three 
levels of assistance: Local, State, and Federal available to emergency planners and 
how the DoD can get involved at all three levels of response. 
 
Figure 15. Local, State-to-State, and Federal Assistance  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
Before initiating the request, however, the State governor must have activated 
the State’s emergency plan and ensured all State and Local resources have been 
appropriately allocated.  Additionally, a survey of the affected area must be 
conducted to determine the extent of the public and private damage that has 
occurred.  A joint preliminary damage assessment conducted with FEMA officials to 
determine the types of Federal damage assistance is also necessary.  In addition, 
the governor must consult with the FEMA Regional Administrator on Federal 
disaster assistance eligibility, and must advise the FEMA regional office that a 
request of the President for a declaration of a major disaster will be sent.  Although 
ordinarily the State governor can follow these steps to get Federal aid, it is possible 
for the President to declare a major disaster or emergency on his own.  This request 
of the President would come directly from the FEMA Regional Administrator based 
on the severity of the disaster and only if an appropriate response will be beyond the 
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Once the FEMA Regional Administrator has evaluated the situation, he sends 
his recommendation to the national FEMA Administrator with the State governor’s 
request.  Through the Secretary of Homeland Security, a recommendation is 
forwarded to the President.  Finally, the President makes his determination and 
declares a major disaster or emergency.  A major disaster declaration provides not 
only Federal assistance but also long-term Federal recovery programs through the 
Presidential Disaster Relief Fund and other disaster aid programs.  An emergency 
declaration, on the other hand, is more specific in scope regarding where funding will 
be provided and does not provide the long-term Federal disaster aid programs (US 
DHS, 2008c). 
Once the President has made a declaration, a Lead or Primary Agency is 
assigned to lead the Federal response.  From that Primary Agency, a Federal 
Coordinating Officer (FCO) will be assigned and deployed, and a Joint Field Office 
will be established, along with the Unified Coordination Group.  The Unified 
Coordination Group consists of the Federal and State Coordinating Officers and 
senior officials from other responding agencies—including the Defense Coordinating 
Officer (DCO) from the DoD.  This Group will coordinate all response efforts to 
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Figure 16. Response Request Process 
3. Mission Assignment 
For the DoD to become involved in a disaster-relief situation, the lead Federal 
agency will then make a request for assistance to the Secretary of Defense.  The 
Secretary will then evaluate that request based on the six criteria: cost, 
appropriateness, readiness, risk, legality, and lethality, as listed above.  For units 
that are already supported through mutual aid agreements or immediate response 
authority, this same process would be used to continue that support.  Once the 
Secretary of Defense has approved the use of DoD forces, USNORTHCOM 
(NORTHCOM) is usually put in operational control of the forces that will be 
deployed.  The regional DCO is then activated and deploys to the Joint Field Office 
to directly support the FCO and be a part of the Unified Coordination Group. As 
shown in Figure 17, the DCO coordinates the interaction between the Primary 
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Figure 17. Interaction Leading to DCO Involvement  
(Derived from Figure 1) 
From the Joint Field Office, the DCO will then receive requests for forces 
through the Mission Assignment Process.  When received, the DCO will validate 
each request using the same criteria and determine if a request is already 
authorized through an existing Standing DSCA Execute Order or if further approval 
is needed.  Once a request is validated, the Mission Assignment is then to 
NORTHCOM, which will review the request and then submit it to the Joint Director of 
Military Support.  He will then determine the unit that can best fill the request from 
the different services and defense agencies.  The request is then forwarded to the 
Secretary of Defense.  If it is approved by the Secretary of Defense, a Deployment 
Order or Execute Order is issued to Joint Forces Command, which will then provide 
the orders for the units that will deploy in support of the disaster response.  Although 
this process appears to be long, it is automated by the DoD DSCA Automated 
Support System (DDASS), which allows all the approval authorities to review and 
approve the requests online, and which cues the next level in real-time.  This 
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V.  Conclusion 
Public scrutiny of the governmental response to natural and man-made 
disasters has increased, as the destruction associated with such disasters reached 
exceptional levels in the 1990s, September 2001, and, most notably, in 2005. A 
number of organizations and entities, as identified within the National Response 
Framework, are tasked with heading publicly funded disaster response and recovery 
efforts. As a department with access to unique capabilities and tremendous 
manpower resources, the Department of Defense is clearly one of the most 
prominent players in large-scale operations. In fact, with the permanent assignment 
of Defense Coordinating Officers/Elements within each of the ten FEMA regions, the 
Department of Defense has clearly demonstrated its commitment to providing 
effective and responsive Defense Support to Civil Authorities. However, the DoD’s 
exact role, as well as the boundaries within which it must operate, remain 
misunderstood by a number of disaster-relief professionals (Lystra, 2009). 
The purpose of our project was to identify the major players involved in DSCA 
operations, as well as the various processes by which civil authorities may request 
and receive military assistance. In so doing, we researched and presented the 
regulations, entities and agencies presently governing DSCA operations. We 
introduced various elements within Figure 1 (which we repeated for the benefit of the 
reader) to identify the key players involved in post-disaster military operations, as 
well as to synthesize the relationships and processes linking these various entities 
and organizations.  
In addition, we provided detailed information regarding the organizations, 
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and of the Department of Defense. We also 
presented the three main processes available to civil authorities to request military 










Figure 19. Relationships between Response Agencies Responsible for 
the Coordination of Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
Here, we present our observations regarding the soundness of the present 
system and whether the reforms implemented over the past few years have 
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We provide the following observations: 
Observation 1:  A key concern of the 2006 report of the “Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina” 
referred to the lack of “information sharing protocol” within the DoD (US Congress, 
2006). USNORTHCOM presently provides the military components tasked with 
providing civil support missions with “enhanced joint situational awareness and 
communication” (US Congress, 2006). Yet, in 2005, the efforts of the Command, 
while commended by the Select Committee, were impaired due to some lingering 
growing pains and relatively inexperienced command structure (US Congress, 
2006). At this point of its existence, USNORTHCOM, with the consolidation under its 
single unified command of disaster-related missions executed by all DoD 
organizations, now enables DoD forces to operate under a unified command 
structure, which is deemed critical to mission accomplishment. Hence, 
USNORTHCOM presently provides the military components tasked with providing 
civil support missions with “enhanced joint situational awareness and 
communication”. 
Observation 2:  The permanent post-Katrina assignment of DCOs/ DCEs to 
FEMA has improved the ability of the DHS and the DoD to coordinate their 
respective efforts. Such a step was critical considering that insufficient coordination 
between DoD/DHS was identified as a contributing factor to the perceived slow 
response of the Federal government during Katrina (US Congress, 2006). Further, 
the assignment of DoD liaison Officers to FEMA regions and their interaction with 
State officials has increased the DoD’s insight into State-level response capabilities 
and the States’ understanding of the constraints within which the DoD operates 
(Armstrong, 2009).  
Observation 3:  FEMA’s ongoing efforts, as mandated by Congress in 2007, 
to develop and maintain “robust Regional Offices” and “partner with State, Local, 
and Tribal governments and emergency response providers, with other Federal 
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national system of emergency management” are essential to improving Federal 
disaster response and recovery operations (US Congress, 2007a, 42). Per 
Congress’ findings, difficulties to coordinate DoD, FEMA and State-level efforts had 
a major impact over the relief efforts conducted post-Katrina. FEMA’s regional 
offices presently provide State, DoD and Federal officials with a well-established 
interface, thus enabling all parties to more effectively prepare, coordinate and 
anticipate response and relief requirements. 
Observation 4:  Joint exercises in Defense Support to Civil Authorities, along 
with Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments, contribute to enhanced coordination and 
integration between active-duty DoD components and NRF participants. It is critical, 
however, that lessons learned throughout such evolutions be implemented in order 
to maximize their benefits. 
Observation 5: The responsibility to be familiar with DoD capabilities, 
operating procedures and request processes rests with emergency planners. In spite 
of the DoD’s efforts to educate Local, State and Federal partners regarding the legal 
and procedural constraints within which the military operates, the DoD remains 
subject to criticism in times of crisis due to its lack of involvement or responsiveness 
(Lystra, 2009).  This project established that the DoD is in a supporting role in times 
of emergency, unless otherwise decided by the President, and it may commit its 
forces and capabilities only under specific conditions. DCOs are, at present time, the 
best-suited source of information available to Local, State and Federal public 
representatives.  
Observation 6: The lack of coordination and integration between National 
Guard and active-duty forces was identified as a major contributor to the impaired 
responsiveness and duplication of military efforts during Katrina (US Congress, 
2006). To this day, Active Duty (Title 10) and National Guard (Title 32) forces remain 
under two separate chains of command when deployed in support of civil assistance 
operations. Unity of command is achieved only under the most extreme conditions 
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Commanders lack complete visibility over the capabilities, personnel and activities of 
their sister services, and fail to maximize the use of their respective resources.  
Rather than authorize Title 10 and 32 forces—as well as all Local, State and 
Federal organizations—to operate independently from each other, we believe that all 
operational orders and mission assignments should be fielded through the Joint 
Field Office (JFO), which is established to coordinate such Federal involvement. 
Such a procedural requirement may be inconvenient to smaller and mainly Local 
organizations. In addition, tensions may arise as cultures, politics and standard 
operational procedures from different levels of government interact within the JFO. 
Yet, such an integration of activities would guarantee enhanced visibility over the 
entire relief effort for decision-makers. Also, politics and organizational pride are of 
diminished importance in the presence of human suffering. Thus, the right force—
either the City Police, Fire Department, National Guards in a law enforcement 
capacity, or Title 10 forces in a logistical support role—may be tasked with the 
mission for which it is best suited. A State Governor may still legally retain control of 
the National Guard members, yet may guarantee their optimal use by allowing the 
JFO’s coordinated command structure to oversee their activities.  
Observation 7: Inter-service cultural, legal, and political constraints may 
prevent a further integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces under the present status. 
However, were the capabilities of the State’s National Guards to increase, and the 
use of EMACs to increase as well, the involvement of active-duty forces may be 
reduced. We believe that National Guard members are best suited to provide military 
relief support to Local communities. Their familiarity with the terrain, community and 
Local leadership, along with their unique law enforcement capabilities and ability to 
train with Local emergency responders, allow them to provide the most responsive, 
flexible and tailored response. Therefore, were the Federal government to finance 
an increase in National Guards and State-level response capabilities, States may be 
able to rely exclusively on each other for disaster support and prevent the 
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Disaster relief operations involve a multitude of organizations, all subject to 
legal, procedural, and political restrictions and, thus, complex in nature. Such 
complexity may result in operational inefficiency, as was the case in the summer of 
2005. The reforms implemented since then, as well as earlier initiatives such as the 
creation of USNORTHCOM and DHS, have improved the ability of Local, State and 
Federal responders to coordinate and integrate their respective capabilities. Defense 
leaders involved in DSCA operations are, on their end, confident that the DoD is 
better prepared and organized than ever to provide responsive and effective military 
assistance to overwhelmed civil authorities. The use and dependence on military 
resources and personnel by State and Local agencies requires, however, that 
emergency responders be familiar not only with the capabilities of the military, but 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 67 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References 
Armstrong, C.M. (2009, August 19). Defense Coordinating Officer Region IX. 
[Interview with researchers]. 
Arnold and Porter LLP. (2002). Federal Authorities for Disaster Response. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Buchalter, A.R. (2007). Military support to civil authorities: The role fo the 
Department of Defense in support of homeland defense. Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. 
Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM). (2006). 
Defense support of civil authorities (USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05). 
Colorado Springs, CO: United States Northern Command. 
Department of Defense (DoD). (1997). Military assistance to civil authorities (DoDD 
3025.15). Washington, DC: Author.  
Department of Defense (DoD). (2009). Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (DoDD 5111.13). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Department of the Army. (1993). Domestic support operations (FMFM 7-10). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2008). Strategic plan, fiscal 
years 2008 – 2013. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2009a, June 4). Defense 
coordinating officer (DCO)/Defense coordinating element (DCE). Retrieved 
July 28, 2009, from http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/regionv/dco_dce.shtm 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2009b, June 25). Organization 
chart, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Retrieved September 10, 
2009, from http://www.fema.gov/about/structure.shtm 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2009c, November 3). National 
Advisory Council. Retrieved December 8, 2009, from http://www.fema.gov/ 
about/nac/ 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2006). Better plans and exercises needed 
to guide the military's response to catastrophic natural disasters. Retrieved 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 68 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2008a). US Northern Command has 
made progress but needs to address force allocation, readiness tracking 
gaps, and other issues. Washington, DC: Author. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2008b). Actions taken to implement the 
post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (1995). Joint doctrine for military operations other than war 
(Joint Pub 3-07). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2007). Peace operations (Joint Publication 3-07.3). 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2005). Homeland security (Joint Publication 3-26). 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Langowski, C.T. (2008). Defense support to civil authorities. Fort Leavenworth, TX: 
US Army Command and General Staff College. 
Lowenberg, M.G. (2005). The role of the National Guard in national defense and 
homeland security. Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the 
United States. 
Lystra, C.R. (2007). Defense support of civil authorities. Washington, DC. 
Lystra, C.R. (2009, October 8). Defense Contractor. [Interview with researchers]. 
Moss, M. L., & Shelhamer, C. (2007). The Stafford Act: Priorities for reform. New 
York City: The Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response. 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). (2008, December 17). The world 
with commanders' areas of responsibility. (National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency map Edition 8 NGA Series 1107). Retrieved September 15, 2009, 
from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/MAP12-08.pdf 
Office of Homeland Security. (2002). National strategy for homeland security. 
Washington, DC: White House. 
Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. 
(2006). The federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Lessons learned. 
Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 
O’Brien, J. (2006). Improving the U.S. military's response to homeland humanitarian 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 69 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Osborne, W.A. (2006, December). The history of military assistance for domestic 
natural disasters: The return to a primary role for the Department of Defense 
in the twenty-first century? The Army Lawyer, pp. 1-18. 
Owens, J.W., & Schilling, T.L. (2006). 4th Brigade, 75th Division as the defense 
coordinating element for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FA Journal, 11(2), 18-
21. 
Renuart, V.E., Jr. (2009, March 17). Statement of General Victor E. Renuart, Jr. 
USAF. Commander of United States Northern Command and North American 
Aerospace Defense Command before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. Washington DC, USNORTHCOM. 
Stockton, P. (2009). Statement by The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and America’s Security Affairs before the 111th Congress 
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 
Threats and Capabilities, United States House of Representatives July 28, 
2009 . Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. 
Tomasini, R.M., & Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2009). Humanitarian logistics. New York: 
INSEAD Business Press. 
Trebilcock, M.C. (2000). The myth of posse comitatus. 153d Legal Support 
Organization, Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Norristown, PA: US Army 
Reserve. 
US Congress (2006). A failure of initiative. Final report of the select bipartisan 
committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina. 109th US Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office.  
US Congress. (2007a). Department of Homeland Security appropriations act, 2007. 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
US Congress. (2007b). Robert T. Stafford disaster relief and emergency assistance 
act (Public Law 93-288), as amended, 42 USC. 5121-5207, and related 
authorities. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS). (2008a). Brief documentary history 
of the Department of Homeland Security 2001–2008. Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security History Office. 
US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS). (2008b). Emergency support 
function #7 – Logistics management and resource support annex. 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 70 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS). (2008c). National response 
framework. Washington, DC: Author. 
US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS). (2008, July 17). US Department of 
Homeland Security organizational chart. Retrieved September 10, 2009, from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm 
US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS). (2008, December). National 
incident management system. Retrieved May 6, 2009, from 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf 
US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). (2009). About USNORTHCOM. 
Retrieved August 15, 2009, from http://www.northcom.mil/about/index.html 
United States Code. (2008). Title 32. Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office. 
United States Code. (2009). Title 10. Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office. 
White House Office of Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. (2006). The federal 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2009 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 
 
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
